Why carry old baggage?
By K.N. Pandita
With the turn of the century, India stumbled on the ambitious concept of “Look East” … a phrase variously interpreted and mostly ascribed to her eastward expansion of trade and business enterprises.
Unrelenting hostility of her immediate western neighbour, raging conflict in Afghanistan and escalating anti-American and anti-Arab acrimony of Iranian hardliner regime are among factors driving India to find new markets and land and sea roots to her east.
But “Looking East” being easier said than done, India had perforce, to reckon with far more pragmatic and workable international relations policy of the Asiatic giant straddling across other continents besides Asia, of course.
“Look East” policy has not yielded sizeable dividends, and at best she was obliged to play the second fiddle to China. In 2006 China’s quantum of trade with South East Asian countries was to the tune of 160 billion US dollars while that of India for the same year was less than $ 30 billion.
On board the Soviet bandwagon during cold war era and championing the unrewarding non-alignment movement, India, unwittingly abandoned her prospect of potent Asian power leaving the field open for China to make deep inroads into the politics and economies of South East Asian countries. For lethargy prone India, it is too late to run a competitive race.
Crossing the self-created fence and straying into the American foreground has its own implications. Adjustability would have been a trifle easier only if India could wriggle out of her five decade old frozen mindset.
India showed morbid reluctance to be a partner in Sino-Russian-Indian Strategic Triangle when Primakov, India’s old friend, and the then premier of the Russian Federation mooted the proposition. The fear of displeasing the US loomed large on her mind.
Distancing herself from regional organizations just for maintaining balance between unbalanced partners has been the bane of India’s foreign policy particularly in the Asian continent. She could afford to be more flexible and pro-active at a number of opportunities. India did not play her role deftly at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization where she was given an observer status. Amusingly India decided even not to send its representative to the SCO summit. Thus we find her left to the peripheries of major foreign policy issues.
A big country would certainly be at disadvantage in trying to please all. We need to learn from the way big countries conduct their bilateral and multilateral relations.
Playing active role in the SCO would in no way strain India’s relations with the US. Sino-US trade in 2006 was ten times ($ 263 billion) the volume of Indo-US trade ($ 29 billion) even when China is the leading member of SCO.
India is not responding to an invitation to join the Australia – Japan-US Trilateral Strategic Dialogue for the fear of displeasing China. Likewise her reluctance to join the proposed Australia – Japan – US Trilateral Dialogue and make it a quadrilateral one would not sour her relations with China. Australia is emerging a major supplier of raw material and energy to China and Sino-Japan trade ($ 207 billion) in 2006 was ten times Sino-Indian trade ($ 25 billion).
More discouraging is the picture of Sino – India quest for hydrocarbon energy whether in the Gulf region or in the new – found oil and gas fields in Central Asia. India is the world’s 6th largest hydrocarbon importing country and China is the third. India faces a real energy dilemma. She has lost energy assets to China in numerous states, Angola, Ecuador, Kazakhstan and Myanmar. The reason for her inability to have stakes there is that she is unable to adopt more strategic and holistic approach towards securing energy assets that integrates financial incentives with aid, infrastructure projects, diplomatic incentives and arms packages. India’s pursuit of importing gas from Bangladesh, Iran, Myanmar and Turkmenistan is stalled by poor security and political instability scenario. Though New Delhi did try to access Central Asian energy resource, yet the fact is that her half-hearted engagement in Central Asian affairs have left her out of active reckoning and China, Russia and the US dominate the energy scene.
India needs to offload the old baggage and come out of her traditional inhibition of shunning active participation in regional organizations. As on of the major importers of energy, India has to keep step with major powers actively interested in oil and gas reserves in Central Asia. It is at least heartening that Indian policy planners are considering investing in Tajikistan’s hydropower production project to obtain a 1000 MW of electricity in near future.
(The writer is the former Director of the Centre of Central Asian Studies, Kashmir University).